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States, were better predictors of riots and their severity than the 16 theoretical indicators combined.
Despite the apparent clarity of Spilerman's findings, scholars did not abandon the theoretical constructs he tested. Much subsequent research has attempted to challenge his findings and revive older explanations of the 1960s riots (for reviews, see Bryan 1979; McPhail 1994; McPhail and Wohlstein 1983; Schneider 1992 ). Despite slight deviations, however, the results of these studies generally support Spilerman's findings: The size of the non-White population accounted for the majority of the variance of riot frequency explained, and other theoretical variables explained only small increments beyond it.
Ultimately, however, there is still a considerable lack of agreement about what factors should remain under consideration as potential causes of rioting. Some scholars conclude that structural strain explanations and other social-psychological explanations have been thoroughly trounced and that new approaches must be developed to identify the underlying determinants of rioting and other collective behaviors (McPhail 1994) . Others maintain the worthiness of grievance and deprivation explanations and continue to invoke slightly recast versions of these theories (Heskin 1985 ; Koomen and Frankel 1992; Polletta 1992 ). These ideas may continue to be popular in part because of the ambiguity resulting from different samples and methods, or simply because "it is very difficult to abandon old explanations" (McPhail 1994:5). However, the continued attractiveness of these previous explanations may hint that the empirical examinations that tested them were inadequate analyses of the processes underlying rioting. This question can be answered by critically examining previous empirical work using new analytical procedures and recent theoretical developments that are better suited to the problem.
Thus, I reexamine Spilerman's data on racial rioting in the 1960s using event history analysis. First, I closely follow his analysis, re-examining his conclusions regarding the structural strain and deprivation arguments. Then, I investigate two additional explanations for rioting-one based on notions of social diffusion and the other based on Olzak's (1987 Olzak's ( , 1992 ) recent work on ethnic competition. Spilerman (1970a Spilerman ( , 1971 Spilerman ( , 1976 ) conducted his analysis of the outbreak and severity of riots by grouping structural strain and other related structural explanations into four basic clusters and adopting indices for each cluster of arguments (Spilerman's variable clusters appear in the stub of Table 2 on page 103). His first variable cluster tested the "social disorganization thesis"-that poorly integrated individuals are outside the general control of community norms and have less access to traditional mechanisms for addressing social grievances (Downes 1968 ). Spilerman's second and third clusters of variables examined the "absolute" and "relative" versions of deprivation arguments. The absolute deprivation argument posits that the most severely dispossessed in society will be the ones who engage in collective violence (Downes 1968 ). The relative deprivation argument (Gurr 1968 (Gurr , 1970 states that a disadvantaged group determines its own level of social and economic deprivation by comparing itself to some reference group; in the case of Spilerman's studies, Blacks would develop a sense of relative deprivation by comparing their situation to that of proximal Whites.
BACKGROUND Structural Strain and Deprivation
Spilerman's third variable cluster tested the "expectations" argument (Berkowitz 1968 ) in which expectations for improved social and economic conditions increase as the disadvantaged group's position improves, thereby leading to heightened frustration if the rising expectations are not met. In this argument, the opposite relationship between deprivation variables and racial rioting is hypothesized: As conditions improve for Blacks, an increase in expectations, frustration, and ultimately the number of riot events occurs.
Finally, Spilerman tested the idea that the lack of access to political representation increases rioting (Lieberson and Silverman 1965) : With no way to address grievances or to have group interests represented in governmental decision-making bodies, Blacks may turn to violence as a method of expressing their demands. As noted above, Spilerman (1970a) found little or no support for any of these arguments in his initial work, in which the frequency of rioting was the dependent variable. When riot severity was the dependent variable and also failed to show support (Spilerman 1976 ), these ideas were further discredited.
In addition to the original four arguments, Spilerman (1970a) also noted several other potential sources of the tendency to riot, but he provided only partial tests. Of these, I examine competition and diffusion.
Competition Models
Competition for scarce resources is often assumed to be a key process underlying most conflicts. When two or more groups compete for a common pool of resources, they inevitably come into conflict, and as the demand for a good increases and the supply decreases, the conflict will increase. Park (1950) Olzak's (1992) recent work offers a promising model that connects economic processes with collective action using ethnic competition as its main mechanism. Her study of ethnic conflict and protest supports three main competition mechanisms: (1) The breakdown of labor market segmentation leads to increased competition between ethnic groups, thereby leading to increased conflict and collective action; (2) immigration increases competition directly (Bonacich 1972; Lieberson 1980 ) and also through its effects on labor market segmentation; and (3) economic contraction exacerbates competition and conflict as it increases competition for employment. While Olzak's analysis is compelling, the collective violence she and others attempt to explain is predominantly that of Whites against ethnic and racial minorities. Rioting in the 1960s, however, was an exception to that pattern. Therefore, if ethnic competition arguments are to be used to explain the Black-initiated property riots of the 1960s, the arguments must be congruent with minority-initiated as well as majority-initiated collective violence.
I propose that while changes in competition may in fact change the levels of collective violence, predicting who will initiate the violence and who will be the target of violence requires knowledge of the outcomes of increased competition. In the cases examined by Olzak, White-initiated violence in response to labor market de-segregation makes intuitive sense because White advantage is threatened by desegregation. However, applying the labor market desegregation argument to Black riots is problematic because it is not clear that Blacks would respond to improved market positions with violence against Whites. Yet it is possible that decreased labor market segregation could lead to violence by Blacks if desegregation led to worse market positions for Blacks. Consider the possibility that desegregation resulted from White invasion of labor niches traditionally dominated by Blacks; the result for some Blacks thus would be unemployment. Rather than an improved labor market position for Blacks, desegregation would have the opposite effect.
Black-initiated violence is more easily understood under such circumstances.
Using the above insight, I treat non-White unemployment as an indicator of competitive labor market outcomes that disadvantage Blacks. I also incorporate variables indicating increased competition in the traditionally Black labor market stemming from nonWhite migration to a city and all immigration to a city from outside the United States.
Both of these variables are particularly relevant to the 1960s because of high levels of interstate migration of Blacks and increasing immigration throughout the 1950s and 1960s. And because competition theory predicts that economic downturns exacerbate any competition-driven ethnic violence, I include indicators of general economic contractions in the analysis. Finally, I examine interactions between immigration and economic conditions implied by competition arguments. Intuitively, the effect of any in-migration should be greater when the economic situation is poor in a particular city (Olzak 1989b) . Conversely, an influx of foreign immigrants or American non-Whites should have a smaller effect on competition and subsequent violence when the economy is faring well.'
Diffusion of Rioting
Diffusion refers to a process in which the occurrence of an event to one member of a population changes the likelihood of such an event occurring to other members of the population (Strang 1991 (Olzak 1987 (Olzak , 1992 . I use spatial and temporal proximity to create three diffusion indicators.
The first diffusion variable is a declining function of geographical distance between a given city and each city that experienced a riot at time t -1. The amount of contagion, c,, experienced by a given city at time t is thus given by: Olzak (1987) found the diffusion-exhaustion cycle to be completed within a period of 30 days. With regard to the 1960s rioting, the Kerner Commission report (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1968) suggested that events clustered in two-week periods. Given these observations and the nature of the data on 1960s riots, I estimate four sets of models using rioting in the past one week, the past two weeks, and the past four weeks. Models using the one-week period were clearly superior; the addition of longer time periods did not improve prediction over the oneweek model. Therefore, here I present only models using the one-week measures.
What Can and Cannot Be Explained
Every analysis is bounded by the scope of the data examined, and the current study is no exception. As were previous studies of the 1960s riots, this analysis is also limited by two key aspects of the data: their temporal scope and their units of analysis. Because the data I examine are limited to the 1960s and compare city-level characteristics, they cannot explain the rise of the unprecedented wave of Black-initiated rioting that occurred in the 1960s. A different type of data set, which provides information on long-term national conditions, is necessary to explain the riot wave (see McAdam 1982; Jenkins and Eckert 1986; and Kelly and Isaac 1984 for empirical investigations of these long-term trends and contexts). In fact, it is exactly this limitation that led Spilerman (1970a) to conjecture about the causes of Black-initiated rioting in the 1960s. Given that Spilerman did not find any city-level differences, he concluded that rioting must be the product of a national phenomenon. Drawing on Tomlinson (1968), Spilerman suggested that the process was actually driven by nationwide conditions that affected all Blacks and by the acceptance of a "riot ideology" among all Blacks; therefore riots would break out randomly, and when and where were governed only by the number of available rioters.
Thus, the current data cannot provide for comprehensive tests of theories about the causes of racial rioting; but they can be more appropriately applied to the question of which cities were more likely to experience rioting given that the riot wave was occurring. Conclusions drawn from this data must take into account these limitations. Thus, my aim is to examine differences in local conditions and to determine if these differences contributed in any systematic way to the pattern of rioting observed during the 1960s.2
DATA
The riot data were collected by Spilerman (1970b) , who cataloged urban riots in the United States for the years 1961 through 1968. He used these in three important studies that tested alternative explanations of riot frequency and riot severity (Spilerman 1970a (Spilerman , 1971 (Spilerman , 1976 For the current study, I further reduced the set of cities examined by eliminating those that had 1,000 or fewer non-Whites in 1960. My rationale for this procedure was that a critical mass of Blacks was necessary to cause rioting. Obviously, a city with no Blacks cannot experience a spontaneous riot, and including cities with few or no Blacks has a powerful effect on the statistical relationship between non-White population size and racial rioting. With no correction, a large portion of the relationship between nonWhite population size and rioting would be due to the fact that Blacks must be present for Black riots to occur. This rather uninteresting finding would confound subsequent interpretations of the effects of non-White population size on rioting. A more interesting question asks whether increases in the non-White population above an essential minimum increase the likelihood of rioting. Spilerman (1971) provides evidence suggesting that the critical number of Blacks needed for rioting in the 1960s was somewhere in excess of 1,000. Therefore, I chose a nonWhite population of at least 1,000 as the critical criterion for including a city in the study. I eliminated 263 cities by this procedure, and it is not surprising that none of these cities experienced a riot during the study period.
Riots included in Spilerman's (1970b) data were those involving at least 30 people, that resulted in violence or the destruction of property, and that were not focused on institutional conflicts (such as those in schools and union halls). Spilerman also classified riots into five types according to the race of the participants and whether the riot was "spontaneous" or arose from a protest (e.g., a civil rights demonstration). Because Spilerman was primarily concerned with random rather than coordinated rioting and because he wished to reduce heterogeneity among the types of riots, he limited his analysis to spontaneous 
ANALYSIS Past Analysis of Racial Rioting
Since the eruption of racial rioting in the 1960s, research methods for examining riot patterns have made important advances. Efforts prior to Spilerman's landmark study had employed pairings of similar cities, one of which had experienced rioting and another which had not (Lieberson and Silverman 1965). As riots occurred in more and more cities throughout the 1960s, adequate pairs of riot and non-riot cities matched on region and population size became increasingly difficult to find. Furthermore, these paired-city studies allowed only a dichotomous classification of cities (riot or non-riot), thereby ignoring differences among cities in which more than one riot had occurred. In response to these problems, Spilerman (1970a) took a large step forward when he used multivariate analysis in which the number of riots in a city was the dependent variable. Since that study and his subsequent examination of riot severity (Spilerman 1976 ), most studies have used some version of multivariate linear regression to examine both riot occurrence and riot severity (Carter 1986 (Carter , 1990 (Carter , 1992 Despite the advances of the multivariate approach, the techniques used were not ideally suited for examining riot data. The first problem arises from using frequencies as the dependent variable. While this approach includes more information than does a dichotomous indicator, it nonetheless represents the set of riots as more homogenous than it actually is. In particular, any temporal relationship within the riots is ignored. That is, a different underlying process may operate for riots that are temporally clustered than for those that are spread evenly across the time period studied.
A second important shortcoming of previous analyses is their inability to introduce covariates that change over time, a particularly difficult problem when attempting to understand diffusion processes (Olzak 1992) . Faced with such a limitation, Spilerman (1970a) selected one major riot incident and attempted to discern geographic diffusion effects. Although his results did not support geographic diffusion, the method itself makes the results unconvincing. In addition to limiting the analysis to only one incident, Spilerman also chose a large, nationally publicized riot (in Newark, New Jersey) as the incident hypothesized to produce diffusion. Because of the large amount of publicity associated with this riot, geographic diffusion effects would be much less apparent than in the case of riots that warranted less national publicity. Furthermore, Spilerman's procedure ignored the possibility that a riot other than a large, nationally publicized one could have diffusion effects. In short, to draw a legitimate conclusion, a comprehensive analysis of the data must incorporate explanatory variables that change as functions of both geographic proximity and time.
Event History Analysis
In response to some of the shortcomings of earlier approaches to rioting, I apply survival analysis or event history analysis to the data described above ( Formally, an event history analysis that models an event that can occur at any point in continuous time specifies the instantaneous rate of transition from one state to another; it is defined as A(t) = lim P(t ? T<t+ At It< T At--->o At where T is the time of the event and A(t) is the hazard rate. In other words, the instantaneous hazard rate (the hazard rate at a given instant) is a function of the probability that an event will occur between t and t + At, given that it has not yet occurred at time t. In this study, this hazard rate is the instantaneous probability that a riot will occur in a given city, given that the city is not rioting as it enters the time point in question. where t1 is the time of occurrence of either an event or censoring, the Pls are coefficients estimating the effects of the k hypothesized explanatory variables, and 3i is a dummy variable that indicates whether the event associated with case i was censored (8i = 0) or was a failure (3i = 1). The coefficients generated are most readily understood by interpreting eP (the hazard ratio) as the amount by which the hazard is multiplied for each unit increase in the related independent variable. In event history analysis, the effects of unobserved heterogeneity must be carefully considered (Allison 1984; Yamaguchi 1991) . Of particular concern here is the lack of independence among repeated observations made on the same city that occurs when all sources of inter-city dependence are not accounted for in the estimated models. Because it is impossible to know if all relevant variables have been included, unobserved heterogeneity usually introduces a downward bias in standard error estimates. In the data studied here, 76 cities experienced more than one spontaneous Black-initiated riot (up to a maximum of 11 in Chicago), therefore the present analysis is highly susceptible to this problem. 5 False duration dependence due to different risk levels among unidentified strata within the sample also can arise in survival analysis. However, this problem is not relevant here because the approach to repeated events does not allow the membership of the population at risk to vary over time. Details regarding this issue as well as alternative methods considered for controlling unobserved heterogeneity in the riot data are available from the author. Table 1 , and an additional 9.3 percent of the variance was explained by non-White population size. Thus 42 percent of the variance in riot frequency was explained by the four clusters of variables. Taken together with the result that 46.8-percent of the variance was explained by only non-White population and the south dummy variable, these findings mean that there is a large overlap among non-White population size, the south dummy, and the variables in the four clusters. This multicollinearity is also apparent in the event history analysis presented in Table 2 . Models run with the individual variable clusters (Models A through D) show many significant relationships between the theorized variables. As the models are combined and Spilerman's key variables are added, nearly all of the theoretical variables become nonsignificant.
Due to these patterns of collinearities, results relying on variance explained or comparisons of models using likelihood ratio tests fail to provide convincing evidence against the theories tested or against the notion that community conditions contribute to rioting. Rather than interpreting the differences in community conditions as negligible, a more reasonable interpretation is that differences are related to rioting, but that the conditions are related to the size of the nonWhite population. In fact, the relationships In the end, the comparison reported in Table 1 does little to either refute or validate the theories tested. It is the pattern of coefficients associated with the theoretical variables in Table 2 Table 3 presents partial likelihood estimates of the effects of competition model variables on the hazard rates of racial rioting. Models A, B, and C estimate the effects for each respective variable cluster. The chisquare associated with each of these models is highly significant (p < .001), although the economic effects on Blacks (Model A) is clearly a more powerful model than the other two. Although nearly all significant coefficients are in the direction predicted by the intergroup competition approach, there is one notable exception: In Model B, the manufacturing wage was predicted to decrease riot risk by alleviating competition, but the data indicate that higher wages actually contributed to an increased risk of racial riots. All of the other significant indicators testing competition theory, including both economic and migration indicators, produced coefficients that support the hypotheses.
Model 1 in Table 3 combines Table 3 is nonsignificant).6 Therefore I use Model 2 as the baseline against which to examine interaction effects between economic factors and migration factors.
While most coefficients in Model 2 remain consistent with Models A, B, and C, the co-6 I conducted alternative analyses carrying forward the variables measuring non-White unemployment rate and the 1950-1960 change in nonWhite population through the remainder of the models presented in this paper. Neither variable achieved significance any model. efficient for the general unemployment rate becomes negative in Model 2, indicating that lower unemployment leads to increased rioting. It is apparent that the change in sign results from adding the (In) number of nonWhite unemployed to Model B. Thus, the coefficient for the general unemployment rate in Model 2 represents its independent effect when holding non-White unemployment constant, an effect that must be due largely to White unemployment. While general unemployment may produce the relationship predicted by competition theory, singling out White unemployment reveals a completely different effect. I also examined a series of interaction effects suggested by competition theory. I examine interactions between economic contraction and migration because the effect of migration on rioting should differ at varying levels of economic contraction. Specifically, when the economy is faring poorly, migration into a city should have greater effects on competition and violence than when the economy is healthy. Thus, I predict a positive coefficient for interactions between the unemployment variables and the migration variables, and a negative coefficient for the interaction between manufacturing wages and the migration variables.
In general, the data do not support the theory in this respect. Of the three possible interactions, two (unemployment rate x percent foreign-born and manufacturing wage x percent foreign-born) do not achieve statistical significance (results not shown). Further, the one significant interaction term (In number of non-Whites unemployed x percent foreign-born) is in the opposite direction of that predicted. The negative coefficient indicates that increases in the percentage of immigrants has a lower effect on rioting when non-White unemployment is high and a greater effect when Black unemployment is low. The coefficients for the model containing this significant interaction term is presented in Model 3 in Table 3 . Instead of these economic and migration variables compounding each other, the effect of one appears to attenuate the effect of the other, thereby suppressing the main effects of both. In sum, however, the interaction effects I have examined contribute little to the prediction or explanation of racial rioting.
Diffusion of Rioting
Analyses of three diffusion variables are presented in Table 4 . First, c,, the spatial diffusion variable defined in equation 1, is incorporated to model the effects of spatial heterogeneity among the riots occurring in the previous week. If the diffusion hypothesis is correct, this diffusion variable should produce a positive coefficient. That is, recent rioting in cities proximal to a given city should increase that city's hazard of experiencing a riot. Second, the measure for national-level diffusion effects (Mti) simply calculates the total number of riots nationally in the previous week. Again, if nationallevel diffusion is occurring, a positive coefficient will be observed. In addition, the square of the national-level diffusion variable represents the tapering effect of additional riots over time. A negative coefficient is expected when this term is added after the unsquared national-level variable, meaning that a high number of recent riots would produce a diminishing hazard for rioting. Table 4 presents results supporting diffusion predictions: All coefficients are in the predicted directions. In Model 1, the positive and significant spatial diffusion coefficient indicates that riots in the prior week increase the likelihood of riots in proximal cities and that this effect diminishes as the distance increases. In Model 2, the nationallevel diffusion variable also has positive and significant effects. The number of riots in the previous week increases the likelihood of rioting in any given week. Also, the number of riots in the previous week has a diminishing effect as the number of riots in the prior week increases, as evidenced by the significant and negative coefficient associated with the squared national-level diffusion term, (Mt-1)2.
The nature of this particular data set suggests an alternative to the diffusion models I offer. As is apparent in Figure 1 , the vast majority of riot events during the study period occurred during 1967 and 1968. Because of the unique character of this period and the specific events that occurred then (such as the Vietnam War and the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy), it is possible that the observed diffusion effect is merely a result of the tight clustering of riot events during a relatively short time period. To test for this possibility, I introduce a dummy variable indicating whether the time period for each observation fell in the 1967-1968 time period. Given the distribution of the riot events across the study period, it is clear that the dummy variable will be highly significant. Interestingly, its effects on the diffusion variables are much less dramatic. As Model 3 in Table 4 shows, when the 1967-1968 dummy is entered, the national diffusion effect decreases slightly but remains highly significant. And there is virtually no effect on the spatial diffusion variable. Despite the unique character of the 1967-1968 period, clearly the diffusion process was operating.
What remains ambiguous to this point is the relative importance of the competition and diffusion variables when compared to the influence of non-White population size. Thus, to complete the analysis, the size of the non-White population must be introduced to evaluate its effects in conjunction with those derived from competition and diffusion argu- Table 4 The structural strain arguments originally examined by Spilerman (1970a) again failed to find support. The arguments do not fail, however, because of the lack of significant relationships between individual variables and rioting. The variables associated with structural strain arguments actually do have important relationships with collective racial violence. Although these relationships are often obscured in multivariate analysis due to collinearity among the variables, this is not the important finding-instead, it is the lack of a coherent pattern among these variables relative to any of the tested theories that stands out. Thus I do not conclude that community characteristics have no relationships with rioting, but rather that the relationships which do exist do not form a coherent pattern to support the specific theories Spilerman tested.
Diffusion
My conclusions regarding the diffusion of racial rioting are quite straightforward, as strong evidence emerged for both national and regional diffusion processes. Although the definitions of diffusion I used here are robust, many questions remain regarding the exact nature of the diffusion process. First, given that the process appears to trail off quickly over a two-week period, a more detailed approach that examines riot data on a daily rather than on a weekly level may provide a fuller picture of this dynamic process. Models incorporating various decaying functions of time may also be useful. Second, although the measure for proximity I used here has proven effective in other studies (Hedstrom 1994), future work should test measures that recognize boundaries that may filter or limit diffusion processes. Third, heterogeneity within the diffusion phenomenon suggests interesting possibilities for modeling diffusion. What differences among riots can cause them to contribute more or less to the diffusion process? Size, severity, amount and type of media attention, and repressive responses are all possible riot characteristics that could affect the diffusion process. Finally, advances in understanding riot and collective action diffusion processes will also depend on learning more about the different communication processes and networks that transmit the information driving the process itself. It may be that information communicated through acquaintance networks has different effects at different rates than does information gained through the mass media. Furthermore, the dynamic interaction of all these possible factors suggests fascinating complexities and hypotheses for future models of collective violence diffusion.
Competition
The hypotheses derived from competition theory found support here, although the interactions suggested by the theory were not important. A city9s median manufacturing wage does not appear at first to support competition notions. Because manufacturing wage is taken as an indicator of a healthy city economy, it was predicted to reduce intergroup competition and thus to decrease collective violence. The apparently contradictory finding can be explained easily if it is understood how economic conditions may effect Blacks and Whites differently. While high manufacturing wages may indicate that the economy is generally strong, labor market segregation causes a strong manufacturing sector to benefit Whites more than Blacks. As Olzak (1992) 
Non-White Population Size and

Unemployment
In this study, the combination of competition and diffusion provides a model that most coherently accounts for differences in riot risks among U.S. cities in the 1960s. This model is superior to models using structural-strain variables and to a model dependent only on non-White population size. The competition/ diffusion model is superior to the non-White population size argument because it illuminates theoretical explanations for rioting. The notion of demographic aggregation or opportunity (via non-White population size) as the sole source of rioting variability is not supported because increases in population size do not increase riot propensity beyond that of other explanatory variables. Clearly, the argument that 1960s rioting was an essentially random process once the demographic aggregation of potential rioters was controlled is not adequate.
A detailed stepwise examination of Model 4 in Table 4 reveals that one of the main variables superseding the size of the non-White population variable is the number of nonWhites unemployed in a given city. In this analysis, regardless of the percent unemployed, it is the number unemployed that has the most powerful effect on riot rates. Three tempting interpretations come to mind. The first is that the non-White unemployment rate is simply a proxy for the non-White population size. While this interpretation is partially true and clearly plausible in the case of cities with similar unemployment rates but different numbers of Blacks (those with higher populations will experience higher rates of rioting), the interpretation breaks down when Black unemployment rates vary. Under such circumstances, cities with larger Black populations and lower unemployment rates could have lower raw numbers of unemployed Blacks than some cities with smaller Black populations and higher Black unemployment rates. Given the results presented here, the cities with larger Black populations would experience less rioting than cities with smaller Black populations, a result which is exactly the opposite of what would be predicted from the proxy argument.
The position I take, however, is not that the size of the Black population is unimportant to riot rates. In fact, the models presented in Table 4 demonstrate that the number of nonWhites unemployed and the size of the nonWhite population are collinear with regard to their ability to predict rioting. Nevertheless, the parameter estimate for the number of unemployed non-Whites is significant, indicating that there are important differences in riot rates that cannot be explained simply by the overlap between these two variables.
A second interpretation of the relationship between the numbers of non-White unemployed and riot rates is that rioting requires biographical availability, and the unem-ployed, given the lack of demands on their time, are the most available segment of the population. While biographical availability has proven to be an extremely useful variable in social movement and collective behavior research (particularly with regard to student protest movements), it is less useful in this context. Many studies conducted on riot participants have found no significant differences in employment status between rioters and non-rioters. For example, Opp (1989) found that unemployment had no relationship to illegal protest and a negative relationship to legal protest. Similar relationships have been found in a number of surveys of participants and nonparticipants of the 1960s riots ( A third explanation of the importance of non-White unemployment to rioting reasons that the unemployed are the most discontent and therefore would be the more likely than the employed to lash out in violence. Again evidence that the unemployed no more constitute the body of rioters than they do the general population contradicts this explanation. Furthermore, few studies have established any attitudinal differences between those who participate in riots and those who do not (Rodgers and Bullock 1974) .
In short, the reason that the number of unemployed is so important to riot rates is not presently clear. It may be that even though the unemployed are not overrepresented among riot participants, they may be overrepresented among those who initiate rioting.
If this were true, biographical availability, severe discontent, or both could be operating. On the other hand, it may be that higher numbers of unemployed Blacks make Blacks' economic problems highly visible and thus highly salient. Such a condition would increase the likelihood of riots independent of biographical availability or participation by the unemployed specifically. At present, available empirical data are not adequate to assess these two possibilities. This study, however, strongly suggests that the role of unemployment is one key to understanding riot outbreaks, and that further research should focus on determining exactly how unemployment contributes to civil unrest.
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